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I. INTRODUCTION
Professor Leonard Riskin introduced his “grid” of mediator orientations almost two years ago.1 The vocabulary of “facilitative” and
“evaluative” mediation derives from that article and his most recent,
eloquent exposition.2
The distinction has become the focal point of constructive dialogue and controversy regarding the nature and scope of mediation.
Riskin and others contend that the range of mediation practices and
values, when properly described, encompasses a wide array of
evaluative conduct by the mediator.3 Some critics retort that
“evaluative mediation” is an oxymoron and that “facilitative mediation” is a redundancy.4 The decided benefit of the Riskin grid and its
attendant analysis, then, is that it invites us to revisit traditional
* Professor of Law and Director of Advanced Studies, University of MissouriColumbia School of Law. B.A., Kalamazoo College, 1967; J.D., New York University, 1970;
Ph.D., University of Rochester, 1975. Member, New York Bar.
1. See Leonard L. Riskin, Mediator Orientations, Strategies and Techniques, 12
ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 111, 111 (1994).
2. See Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding Mediators’ Orientations, Strategies, and
Techniques: A Grid for the Perplexed, 1 HARV. NEGOTIATION L. REV. 7, 23-24 (1996).
3. See id. at 44.
4. Kimberlee K. Kovach & Lela P. Love, “Evaluative” Mediation Is an Oxymoron, 14
ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 31, 31 (1996).
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questions regarding the nature of the process, its users, and its practitioners, sharpened with increased insights regarding dispute
resolution theory and the lessons of mediation’s current widespread
use.
If the debate were simply a terminological quibble about the use
of a particular term, “mediation,” then people would probably not be
so agitated by the proffered distinction. However, considerably more
is at stake. First, to embrace the grid as a descriptive account of mediation practice requires one to accept four implausible conclusions
about mediation and mediation practice. Such a description requires
us: (1) to deny our capacity to evaluate or criticize intervener performance as being capably or ineptly executed; (2) to accept a “marketplace driven” vision of the delivery of mediation services whose
rationale is inconsistent with—and, hence, defeats—the very claim
of customer preference it tries to advance; (3) to ignore how certain
mediator orientations described by the grid, especially the evaluative
approach, undermine a mediator’s neutrality by potentially incorporating practices that skew or disadvantage parties on grounds of
gender or race; and (4) to unnecessarily constrain the potential range
of process use.
Second, although each of the criticisms noted above assumes, for
argument purposes, that the definitions and descriptions contained
in the grid are correct, I ultimately believe they are materially inaccurate. To accept the accuracy of the grid’s portrayal of the key operative phrases “facilitative” and “evaluative” leads to an account of
mediation that distorts the techniques, strategies, and theories that
are distinctive of the mediator’s role. The grid deprives, without
theoretical justification, facilitative interveners from performing certain acts that are consistent with their theoretical conception of being a neutral intervener, while arrogating to evaluative interveners
a philosophical framework that is inconsistent with their practitioner values. In short, I argue that any orientation that is “evaluative”
as portrayed on the Riskin grid is conduct that is both conceptually
different from, and operationally inconsistent with, the values and
goals characteristically ascribed to the mediation process.
After reviewing in Part II the Riskin grid and the framework of
the debate it has generated, I offer justification for my criticisms. In
Part III, I identify and assess four implausible consequences about
mediator practice that flow from the assumption that the grid’s description of the broad range of behaviors it identifies as “mediator
behaviors” is accurate.
In Part IV, however, I turn to examine directly the proffered distinction between facilitative and evaluative mediator orientations. I
argue that the facilitative/evaluative dichotomy is a false one, but
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not for reasons that will give comfort to those who have rushed to
style themselves as either “evaluative” or “facilitative.”
II. THE RISKIN GRID: AN OVERVIEW OF THE CONTROVERSY
Riskin attempts to clarify the confusion that he believes surrounds conversations about the nature of mediation. Specifically,
Riskin suggests that gaining clarity on what the range of current
mediation practices “is” will illuminate our answer to what mediation practices “ought” to be.5 Hence, in his grid, he attempts to sort
out the range of mediator orientations that have been observed in
practice or reported across a broad spectrum of substantive contexts.
He notes that two primary factors determine a mediator’s orientation: whether the mediator deploys “evaluative” or “facilitative”
strategies and techniques to achieve the goal of helping parties address and resolve the problems at issue, and whether the mediator
and parties focus the subject matter of the mediation narrowly or
broadly.6 With these two elements, the grid quickly takes shape.
Some commentators interpret Riskin’s grid to be both descriptive
of current practices and, more disturbingly, to be prescriptive in nature.7 Their concern, stated in the vernacular, is that “just because
someone says that what she is doing is mediation does not make it
mediation”; for Riskin to suggest, via the grid, that all orientations
are indeed mediator behaviors fails to keep boundaries among otherwise sharply distinguishable dispute resolution processes. Riskin
surely gives his critics language to justify such a reading. He writes:
I do not aim . . . to favor one type of mediation over another . . . . I
try to include in my system most activities that are commonly
called mediation and arguably fall within the broad definition of
the term. I know that some mediators object to such inclusiveness,
and fear that somehow it will legitimize activities that are inconsistent with the goals that they associate with mediation. Although I sympathize with this view, I also disagree with it. Usage
determines meaning. It is too late for commentators or mediation
organizations to tell practitioners who are widely recognized as
mediators that they are not . . . .
....
The grid can help in selecting a mediator because it includes virtually all activities that are widely considered mediation.8

5. Riskin, supra note 2, at 9.
6. See id.
7. See Videotape: Interview of Professor Robert A. Baruch Bush, Hofstra Law
School (Professor Lela P. Love, Clinical Professor of Law, Cardozo Law School 1995) (on
file with Professor Love).
8. Riskin, supra note 2, at 12-13, 40 (footnotes omitted).
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While Riskin clearly notes that there are strengths and weaknesses for each of the respective orientations, he endorses each approach as being legitimate mediation practice 9 and affirmatively indicates that he is trying to “categorize the various approaches to mediation so that we can better understand and choose among them.” 10
He believes that the discussion should not be about whether a particular orientation is “really” mediation.11 He would instead focus on
clarifying for the potential user what orientation a mediator actually
embraces, whether that orientation meets the preferences of the users, and whether the mediator’s training and experience reinforces
and advances that orientation.12 Some critics reject this approach.
Some argue that “evaluative mediation” (particularly, the
“evaluative-narrow” orientation) is an oxymoron. 13 They maintain
that evaluative activity by a mediator distorts the distinctive attributes of the mediation process and undermines the contribution a
mediator makes when serving the disputing parties. 14 These critics
urge that what is distinctive about mediation is its capacity to increase parties’ understanding of one another’s situation and, based
upon such understandings, to develop concrete resolutions of their
tangible concerns that are acceptable to all parties. 15 Concepts of
empowerment, participation, and the freedom to develop or reject
proposed solutions are prominently featured in the facilitative approach,16 but are denigrated and undermined when the intervener
becomes evaluative. Hence, critics argue that anyone engaging in activity that is in the northern, evaluative sphere of the grid is not
doing “mediation.”17
That is not to say, the critics quickly note, that such persons
might not be performing a valuable service or that the service might
not be one that particular parties desire; critics insist, however, on
urging that such conduct not be labeled “mediation.” 18 They urge us
to clarify and to distinguish dispute resolution proceedings from one
another—that is, to recognize the differences between the problem9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

See id. at 13.
Id.
See id. (preferring categorization over exclusion).
See id. at 40-41.
See Kovach & Love, supra note 4, at 31. See generally ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH &
JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION: RESPONDING TO CONFLICT THROUGH
EMPOWERMENT AND RECOGNITION (1994) (arguing that a problem-solving approach to mediation can lead to directives from the mediator that overshadow the goal of satisfying the
parties’ needs).
14. See Kovach & Love, supra note 4, at 31.
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. See Lela P. Love, The Top Ten Reasons Why Mediators Should Not Evaluate, 24
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 937, 948 (1997).
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solving processes used in mediation and the evaluative processes
used in adjudicatory processes—and the consequent skills and
knowledge each intervener must bring to the respective enterprise. 19
Riskin’s proposal to label such different activities with the same
term does not, despite Riskin’s assertion, make those activities the
same (“[u]sage determines meaning”20); to characterize the critics’ response in the Wittgensteinian terms that Riskin invites, the critics
maintain that the processes described by the grid neither generate
nor bear “family resemblances”21 to one another. In short, they are
not the “same” enterprise.
Another voice and perspective in this dialogue is frequently articulated by those very practitioners whose conduct scholarly commentators attempt to describe. The practitioner perspective suggests
that the orientation of the effective mediator—with “effective” defined as someone who has an active, remunerative mediation practice—falls within several quadrants of the grid. “Sometimes I’m facilitative; sometimes I’m evaluative. Sometimes I focus narrowly;
sometimes broadly. And, in fact, it could all happen within the same
mediation!”22 Riskin appears to allow for this type of response when
he notes that some mediators can adopt whatever style the selecting
parties or counsel announce at the outset that they want. 23 Additionally, Riskin notes that sometimes during the course of the mediation
conference itself, a mediator might change her orientation based
upon the circumstances.24 While both of these dimensions seem to
capture part of the spirit of the practitioner’s insight, the practitioner still confronts the queasy feeling that something is missing in
the explanation. I will argue below that the missing piece is the inability of the grid’s analysis to assist the practitioner in knowing
why she should move or is justified in moving from one orientation to
another. The practitioner is left simply saying that “one knows what
to do when the situation arises.” That response was inadequate in
obscenity cases,25 and it fails to provide the necessary criteria for determining appropriate mediator behavior as well.

19. See id.
20. Riskin, supra note 2, at 13.
21. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS para. 67, at 32e (G.E.M.
Anscombe trans., MacMillan Co. 3d ed. 1958) (1953).
22. This comment was made by several experienced civil trial mediators attending a
master class for mediators conducted by the author and Lela P. Love in St. Augustine,
Florida, from May 31 to June 2, 1995. For a statement of a similar position advocating
flexibility, see ERIC GALTON, REPRESENTING CLIENTS IN MEDIATION 4 (1994).
23. See Riskin, supra note 2, at 40-41 (discussing criteria for selecting mediators).
24. See id. at 41 (asserting that flexible mediators who are able to change orientation
as needed are available).
25. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (observing of obscenity that “I know it when I see it”).
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So what is the debate on the grid about? All participants in the
debate focus on what people do as mediators. The critics argue that
every orientation carries with it a commitment to particular visions,
values, and behaviors that the intervener is trying to promote, and
that not all visions fit consistently in the category of mediation. 26
Further, they argue that the facilitative vision embraces one of party
participation in problem-solving activities in a manner that features
party choice.27 Evaluative activity of any kind operates at crosspurposes with those goals.28 To promote clarity of choice, then, they
urge that the use of the term “mediation” (and its implementing program rules, training focus, etc.) should be reserved to the facilitative
orientation, given that such values and approaches resonate most
closely with the historical tradition and public policy associated with
it.29
The response of Riskin and practitioners agrees with the general
proposition that some orientations promote certain goals but not
others.30 However, Riskin maintains that: (1) the description of the
broader range of mediator orientations portrays more accurately
what is being done in the name of mediation; (2) clarity in mediator
orientation facilitates informed party process choice; and (3) an individual mediator can operate consistently across various quadrants. 31
I believe that the practitioner is uneasy with the critics’ perspective
because she believes that some of the evaluative behaviors described
by the grid are ones she deploys and views as essential for effective
mediation service. The facilitative approach, by contrast, seems
oblivious to the energy, temperament, force, and edge that is often
required for effective mediator interventions. I believe that the practitioner is equally uncomfortable with Riskin’s account because it
seems to license behaviors that are both inconsistent with mediation
being a consensual process and are arguably proscribed by state and
professional codes of conduct under which they operate. 32 The debate
at this level presumes that Riskin’s description of mediator orientations and strategies is accurate. In Part IV, I argue that this description is materially inaccurate; hence, the debate takes place on a
foundation of quicksand. Before turning to that argument, however,
I will analyze four unlikely conclusions about mediator practice that
result from assuming the plausibility of Riskin’s description.
26. See Kovach & Love, supra note 4, at 31.
27. See Love, supra note 18, at 939.
28. See Kovach & Love, supra note 4, at 32.
29. For a related discussion, see CHIEF JUDGE’S N.Y. STATE COURT ALTERNATIVE
DISP. RESOL. PROJECT, COURT-REFERRED ADR IN N.Y. STATE 7 (1996).
30. See Riskin, supra note 2, at 41 (allowing that each approach has potential advantages and disadvantages).
31. See id. at 38-41.
32. See Love, supra note 18, at 940-41.
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III. CONSEQUENCES OF THE RISKIN GRID
If Riskin’s overall account of mediator orientations and strategies
is correct, four troublesome consequences result.
A. There Is No Criterion for Critiquing Mediator Performance
(Whether Facilitative or Evaluative) Other than the Single Dimension
of the Efficiency with Which Parties Reach (or Fail to Reach) the
Stated Goal of the Mediator’s Orientation
Consider the evaluative mediator. She is portrayed as someone
who provides guidance to parties as to appropriate settlement terms
in light of the legal, industry, or technology considerations with
which the mediator is reasonably conversant. 33 In such circumstances, what counts as “good” or “bad” mediating? Presumably, the
assessment turns completely on whether the mediator was successful in getting the parties to accept her assessment of the outcome
and the settlement terms offered. However, that is simply to define
good and bad in terms of efficiency in reaching a settlement.
Whether the mediator listened to the parties or their counsel, captured their concerns, or crafted an agreement compatible with their
values is irrelevant. The only test of success is whether the mediator
convinced the parties to accept an outcome. To paraphrase H.L.A.
Hart’s wonderful example, mediating is simply the case of “the gunman writ large”;34 that is, if the mediator is articulate, adept with
figures, or in any other manner dangerously persuasive, then, on the
Riskin grid, such conduct is not subject to criticism if the parties
reach agreement. We may observe that the mediator could have
achieved the same results even if she had been less blustery, more
subtle, less belligerent, or less authoritative, but such observations
are simply comments about style. Nothing in principle is improper
about the mediator bullying someone into an agreement as long as
there is some operative notion that the parties “voluntarily” agreed
to the outcome (for example, they had counsel, were not compelled
under duress to accept the terms, etc.). There is no sense in which we
can say of the mediator’s performance, “You should not do that,”
where “should” appeals to some value other than whether (and how
quickly) the parties accepted (the mediator’s) proposed settlement
terms.
Similar comments hold true for evaluating the performance of the
facilitative mediator. The primary mission of the facilitative mediator,
33. See Riskin, supra note 2, at 26.
34. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 80 (1961).
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according to Riskin, “is to clarify and to enhance communication between the parties in order to help them decide what to do.” 35 If the
mediator asked questions in carefully crafted and open-ended language, crystallized issues in neutral terms, thoughtfully designed a
discussion agenda that enabled parties to reorient and enrich their
understanding of one another, effectively but indirectly probed for
possible options, or thoughtfully prompted parties to think about the
consequences of not settling, and all of those efforts still failed to
lead the parties to an enhanced understanding of their situation or
improved communication (let alone a resolution), we cannot, according to the grid, say of that individual that she mediated well but
was not successful. All we can say is that she was not effective in
having the parties achieve the stated goal.
The general structure of this criticism, then, is that by letting a
thousand flowers bloom in the name of mediation, the grid embraces
whatever values a particular orientation espouses. Since all orientations are “mediation,” no commanding, independent analytical
framework for evaluating mediator performance emerges. By necessity, we are constrained to evaluating the conduct from the frame of
reference of the quadrant within which one finds oneself. That
evaluation reduces everything to a matter of efficiency, not propriety.
Riskin, on pain of contradiction, must be wedded to this analytical
consequence. For if he were to begin to offer some goals and values
(for example, that mediation is consensual and participatory) as being distinctive of the mediation process, thus indicating standards
against which one can evaluate mediator conduct, then the gate is
opened to ask why those values, but not others, were included. Since
the grid has no way in principle of foreclosing any values from being
acceptable, it relinquishes all claims to establishing a noninstrumental foundation on which to critique mediator conduct.
B. The Marketplace Vision of the Delivery of Mediation Services
Cannot Do What Its Advocates Propose
Some argue that the intervener should adopt the orientation that
the parties desire.36 If parties or their counsel want an evaluation,
the mediator should provide it. If they want facilitation, the mediator should act accordingly. The mediator who can service the broadest client base is that individual who adapts her orientation to market demands.37
35. Riskin, supra note 2, at 24.
36. See Riskin, supra note 2, at 39-41.
37. See id. at 40-41. This is not to say, of course, that the person who is most successful economically as a mediator or who services the largest clientele must be the most
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However, this analysis collapses in an instructive way. Consider
the situation in which Party A or her lawyer indicates that she prefers a mediator with an evaluative-narrow orientation, and Party B
or her lawyer indicates that she prefers a mediator whose orientation is facilitative-broad. If one assumes that the parties are ordered
to appear in mediation, how should the mediator proceed? The obvious answer is that the mediator must choose which orientation to
adopt. That choice might be influenced by the mediator’s convictions
about the values of conversations and settlement discussions or her
probabilistic assessments of which style will appeal to the largest
segment of the financially paying mediation clients; the reasons, at
this level, are irrelevant. The compelling insight is that the mediator
must choose which orientation to adopt, not the parties. Thus, the
market-demand analysis simply folds.
C. Some Orientations May Incorporate Practices That
Systematically Favor the Participation of One Party over Another
Assume that the grid accurately describes acceptable mediation
practices. Do the orientations share a consistency of values in their
process guidelines? I do not believe they do.
For example, recent communication literature suggests that conversational patterns among males and females are importantly different.38 Some patterns appear to be characteristic of males—for example, argumentative comments designed to assert a certain dominance in the conversational relationship—whereas other styles that
emphasize relational connections appear more congruent with female orientations.39 Acknowledging that much of the analytical and
empirical work in this area is quite tentative, I do believe that it is
sufficiently rich to at least ask the following question: In a conference conducted pursuant to the evaluative-narrow orientation, would
the structure of the conversation, with the advocates presenting the
case, submitting facts, and proffering argumentative conclusions to
the third-party intervener, operate to favor one gender over another? If
any plausibility attaches to the claim that such an argumentative flavor might favor males over females, then certainly the mediator must
revisit her claim that she is conducting a conversation that is without
bias, for the game is skewed from the outset. From this admittedly
adaptable, for it may be the case, as Riskin’s analysis suggests, that most of the users of
mediation services prefer only one type of orientation.
38. See generally DEBORAH TANNEN, YOU JUST DON’T UNDERSTAND: WOMEN AND MEN
IN CONVERSATION (1990) (explaining gender influences on communication); CAROL
GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN’S DEVELOPMENT
(1993) (proposing that women and men undergo different types of psychological development because of their differing perceptions of the world).
39. See TANNEN, supra note 38, at 149.
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guarded perspective, the facilitative approach then appears to at
least leave open the possibility of a more equitable conversational
climate. In that important sense, the structure of the conversation
can either support or undermine a viable notion of power balance
and equality as being valued features of the problem-solving process.40
I recognize that the type of analysis, conversation, and conjecture
noted immediately above is a tentative and awkward one at best.
The hesitancy surfaces because the primary claims in communication theory seem so contestable and, perhaps more significantly, because we are trained to believe that one important method for “balancing inequalities” is to insist upon following a set of impartial procedures that prevent the most powerful, articulate, or domineering
individual from overwhelming the other party, irrespective of the
merits of the controversy.41 Nevertheless, I believe that the grid’s
analysis constructively compels us to pause in our skepticism of
those matters. If the findings of communication theorists are in any
way credible, then the decision to be “evaluative” rather than “facilitative” in one’s orientation has serious repercussions with respect to
the fairness of the process and the justice of the ensuing results.
D. The Scope of Usefulness of the Mediation Process Is
Unnecessarily Constrained
The image of mediation portrayed in the grid is governed by a
conception of mediation as being an alternative to some other identifiable decisionmaking procedure. To play upon the well-worn phrase,
the mediation captured by the grid is being conducted in the
“shadow of a trial.”42 If the parties do not resolve their differences in
mediation, then some other dispute resolution forum—most likely an
adjudicatory one (trial, arbitration, or administrative hearing)—will
take place.
40. For related comments and perspectives that analyze the difference in impact between a listener’s guiding a discussion and the speaker’s engaging in uninterrupted exposition, see the discussion in Freud’s autobiographical study of his change of methods from
hypnosis to psychoanalysis in THE FREUD READER 13-19 (Peter Gay ed., 1989).
41. Indeed, this is the point of the criticism advanced by ADR critics. See Owen M.
Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1076 (1984) (arguing that inequality of resources between the parties can skew settlement proposals); see also Trina Grillo, The
Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545, 1550 (1991) (asserting that individuals who feel compelled to maintain a connection to another person
are at a disadvantage in mediation). The argument I advance in the text suggests, contrary to these critics, that those very procedures, when used in an allegedly mediatory
context, might serve to reinforce inequalities rather than balance them, thereby undermining the common aspiration of constructing a fair environment for dialogue.
42. The phrase, “bargaining in the shadow of the law,” gained widespread currency
following the publication of Robert H. Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the
Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
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Mediation, however, has far more extensive uses than that—and
when one envisions its applications, some mediator orientations are
immediately deemed irrelevant. An evaluative-narrow orientation
for a peer mediator in a high school converts the peer into a school
guidance counselor. When the Department of Justice dispatches a
team of mediators to service racial conflicts or the Federal Mediation
and Conciliation Service assigns a mediator to help management
and union bargaining teams resolve a private-sector collectivebargaining impasse, the last thing parties will embrace is someone
who has come to tell them how to live their lives. In short, parties
operating in important contexts in which mediation is used have no
tolerance for the evaluative orientation. The response, “Well, for certain types of disputes, certain orientations would not be effective or
well-suited,” is not sufficient. The mismatch in orientation stems
from the fact that dissimilar values and goals make the intervention
something different. That insight leads to the more fundamental
flaw generated by the grid’s analysis, namely that the proffered distinction between evaluative and facilitative is not persuasive.
IV. THE EVALUATIVE/FACILITATIVE DICHOTOMY: A FALSE VISION
What does it mean to be evaluative or facilitative? Riskin’s initial
account asserts:
The mediator who evaluates assumes that the participants want
and need her to provide some guidance as to the appropriate
grounds for settlement—based on law, industry practice or technology—and that she is qualified to give such guidance by virtue of
her training, experience, and objectivity.
The mediator who facilitates assumes that the parties are intelligent, able to work with their counterparts, and capable of understanding their situations better than the mediator and, perhaps,
better than their lawyers. Accordingly, the parties can develop better
solutions than any the mediator might create . Thus, the facilitative
mediator assumes that his principal mission is to clarify and to
enhance communication between the parties in order to help them
decide what to do.43

From these orientations, a mediator utilizes a range of strategies
(plans) and techniques (particular moves or behaviors) to effectuate
those strategies.44 Again, the critical claims are made in Riskin’s descriptions of these choices:
A principal strategy of the evaluative-narrow approach is to help
the parties understand the strengths and weaknesses of their positions and the likely outcome of litigation or whatever other process
43. Riskin, supra note 2, at 24 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
44. See id. at 26.
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they will use if they do not reach a resolution in mediation . But the
evaluative-narrow mediator stresses her own education at least as
much as that of the parties. Before the mediation starts, the evalu ative-narrow mediator will study relevant documents, such as the
pleadings, depositions, reports, and mediation briefs. At the outset
of the mediation, such a mediator typically will ask the parties to
present their cases, which normally means arguing their positions,
in a joint session. Subsequently, most mediation activities take
place in private caucuses in which the mediator will gather additional information and deploy evaluative techniques . . . .45

By contrast, Riskin characterizes the approach of the facilitative
mediator in the following way:
The facilitative mediator believes it is inappropriate for the mediator to give his opinion, for at least two reasons. First, such opinions might impair the appearance of impartiality and thereby interfere with the mediator’s ability to function. Second, the mediator
might not know enough—about the details of the case or the rel evant law, practices or technology— to give an informed opinion.46
The facilitative-narrow mediator . . . does not use his own assessments, predictions, or proposals. Nor does he apply pressure. He
is less likely than the evaluative-narrow mediator to request or to
study relevant documents.47

This picture of mediator orientations, however, is significantly distorted and supports mediator stereotypes that are not helpful. It ascribes attributes to facilitative mediators that render their service
ineffective from the onset. As I argue below, this picture incorporates
into the evaluative mediator’s orientation a range of behaviors that
lead quickly to transforming the mediator’s role into an adjudicatory
one.
A. The Substantive Knowledge Possessed by the Mediator
The grid and accompanying descriptions portray the evaluative
mediator as one who is knowledgeable about the law, industry practices, or technology shaping the context of the dispute. By contrast,
the facilitative mediator “might not know enough—about . . . the
relevant law, practices or technology—to give an informed opinion.” 48
The picture created is that the facilitative mediator does not have to
know about these matters to perform the mediator’s role as she env isions it.49 However, this is false for two reasons.
45. Id. at 26-27 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
46. Riskin, supra note 1, at 111 (emphasis added).
47. Riskin, supra note 2, at 28 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
48. Riskin, supra note 1, at 111.
49. See id. at 113. Riskin suggests that because the facilitative-broad mediator “emphasizes the participants’ role in defining the problems and in developing and evaluating
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First, knowing the relevant law, industry practice, or technology
does not per se make one an “evaluative” mediator, for the issue is
how the mediator uses that knowledge during the conversation.
Surely a person unconditionally committed to assisting parties reach
a resolution that they find acceptable can be as knowledgeable about
relevant matters as the “evaluative” mediator, but yet refrain from
predicting probable litigation outcomes and the like when trying to
help parties reach agreement.
Second, according to the description, the facilitative mediator is
one who “ask[s] questions . . . to help the participants understand . . .
the strengths and weaknesses of each side’s case and the likely consequences of non-settlement, as well as the costs of litigation (including expense, delay, and inconvenience).” 50 Other techniques used
include helping the parties develop their own proposals, helping the
parties exchange proposals, and helping the parties evaluate proposals.51 However, the image created by the first distinction suggests
that all of these latter techniques are employed by the facilitative
mediator in a knowledge vacuum—that is, that she asks questions or
assesses proposed settlement offers without having any grounding in
the relevant law, legal processes (trial tactics, etc.), industry practices, or technology. In short, the image of the facilitative mediator is
that she is, by design, a “know-nothing” intervener who focuses exclusively on facilitating conversations between the contestants. This
image is misleading because it suggests that one can formulate constructive or probing questions that help create movement towards
settlement without the need to be informed about the relevant substantive and practice areas of the dispute. However, that proposition
is false as a matter of epistemology. In any context—for example,
persons mediating a case, college students participating in a classroom discussion, or friends engaging in a dialogue about matters relating to parenting practices—those persons who are most able to
ask thoughtful, insightful questions about the topic under review are
precisely those who are the most informed about the events, practices, and human behaviors that are the subject matter of conversation. The unprepared participant has the least to contribute to the
discussion. If the grid’s account of the facilitative mediator is correct,
however, then the mediator who is labeled “facilitative” is straddled
with a knowledge-vacuum that makes it impossible for her to execute her role, even as the grid defines it for her. Furthermore, if the
proposals, the facilitative-broad mediator does not need to fully understand the legal posture of the case.” Id.
50. Riskin, supra note 2, at 28 (emphasis added); see also id. at 51 n.68 (providing a
more extensive, illustrative list of the types of questions that the facilitative-narrow mediator might ask).
51. See id. at 29.
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facilitative mediator, conceptually speaking, is neither well-informed
about the context within which the parties’ concerns collide nor capable of asking questions that can probe, challenge, or illuminate the
possibilities for movement, then the mediator-practitioner’s skepticism about whether any party or her lawyer would ever hire such an
individual is certainly well-grounded. Why should the “market”
players spend time and money utilizing someone whose ability to facilitate problem-solving is severely handicapped from the outset? No
reason exists to do so, and a person wanting to earn a living as a
mediator would be committing economic suicide by presenting herself in this posture.
Intuitively, however, the facilitative mediator has a much better
case to make for herself than the grid’s analysis licenses. Although
the case elaborated below speaks to a more prominent role in her
helping parties to constructively confront the urgency and concreteness of their dispute, the facilitative mediator cannot make that case
if strapped by the qualities attributed to her by the grid.
B. The Mediator’s Preparation for and Conduct of the Mediation
Conference
The grid portrays the evaluative mediator as someone who will
study relevant documents, such as the pleadings, depositions, reports, and mediation briefs, before the first joint session and then
begin the mediation by asking the parties to present their cases,
“which normally means arguing their positions, in a joint session.” 52
Again, the implied contrast is that the facilitative mediator, minimally, refrains from all pre-mediation review of relevant documents
or orientation to the substantive controversy. The stronger implication is that the facilitative mediator would not look at these documents at any time during her service because they are not relevant
to performing her role. As to the manner in which the mediation conference is conducted, the evaluative mediator begins by having the
parties present their respective cases. Although Riskin and others do
not state how the facilitative mediator would commence the conversation, the implication is that she would begin differently.
Again, it is important to assess the picture of the facilitative mediator that emerges from these descriptions and comparisons. The picture is that of a person who does not soil her hands by immersing herself in the documents that have helped shape the case; she does not
allow parties or their representatives to present their concerns in a
manner that resembles, at least initially, the format of an adversarial
hearing or to allow for exchanges that exhibit contentious behavior
52. Id. at 26-27.
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among the parties. This picture of the ground rules that a facilitative
mediator might establish reinforces the perception of her being a
nice but ineffective person (a “Mr. Rogers,” as one person derogatorily puts it53); she is ineffective because the ground rules undermine
her capacity to influence party conversation. However, this image is
also significantly misleading. I consider each element in turn.
1. Mediator Preparation
An important question for mediator practice is whether a mediator, prior to convening the first joint session, should review documents, memoranda, or other items (for example, a mediation brief)
that set forth the background and focus of the controversy. Some
might argue for the importance of having the mediator prepare herself for the conversation with as much information as is known and
made available to her by each of the parties to the controversy. Indeed, parties can save time and money by having the mediator study
such documents prior to the first joint session. A competing perspective is that the mediator’s perception of the dispute is best developed
by having all parties to the controversy give live presentations to the
mediator while in one another’s presence. In that way, the mediator
will not impair her neutrality by prematurely developing beliefs or
attitudes about what issues are in play or by artificially restricting
the range of possible settlement options that might otherwise
emerge from her pre-hearing review and assessment of written
documents. I believe that mediator practices can legitimately vary on
this matter across the dispute arena, so that what might be appropriate and reasonable in one context (for example, litigation-based
cases in which formal documents and arguments are routinely prepared) is inapposite in another (for example, explosive community
disputes).
Although the matter of the appropriate timing for reviewing such
documents may arguably differ among contexts, it does not follow
that a facilitative mediator should not review or analyze such documents at some point in time . Moreover, what is misleading about the
image of the facilitative mediator created by the grid’s descriptions is
the suggestion that the facilitative orientation does not require the
intervener to conduct informed, careful study of documents or to perform studies that may be relevant to an increased understanding of
the operating environments of the parties. This posture is simply
implausible. Consider the person serving as a mediator in discussions between a school district representative and a parent who is
contesting the adequacy of the school’s proffered individualized
53. RICHARD H. RALSTON, DEFENSE RESEARCH INST., INC., ADR FOR THE DEFENSE
SEMINAR: “EFFECTIVE ADVOCACY AND MEDIATION” 3 (1994).
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education plan for the child who qualifies for such attention under
federal and state disabilities laws. Should the mediator ignore the
range of options licensed by the statutory provisions? Should the
mediator dismiss as irrelevant any and all evidence as to how the
school district has addressed such matters in other cases? Unless
one wants to argue the value of communicating such data in oral
form rather than in writing, it is difficult to imagine how an intervener could be helpful to the parties by refusing to bring such information into the discussion. The image that one can “wing it” or focus
primarily on process unjustifiably denigrates the skills required to
help parties reach a resolution that they find acceptable.
2. Mediator Conduct
Conducting a constructive conversation is challenging under the
best of circumstances. Conducting it when people are experiencing
stress, apprehension, or tension, as is frequently the case with parties in a dispute, is even more challenging. How should a mediator
proceed? The grid’s picture of the evaluative mediator is that of one
who orchestrates the conversation, at least initially, in a way that
resembles what we know to be a courtroom or adversary proceeding:
parties state positions, counter the opposite’s argument, and otherwise behave in a distributive fashion.54 The facilitative mediator, by
contrast, tries to conduct the dialogue so that parties focus on being
nonadversarial, look for win-win solutions, and otherwise engage in
collaborative behaviors.
Again, mediator-practitioners, particularly those working with
parties and counsel in matters of complex civil litigation, are the
first to state vehemently that participants shape and approach the
mediation session with a distributive mind-set; none of the parties to
the mediation, or their counsel, have agreed in advance to “leave
such attitudes at the door.” Surely this observation is plausible. In
short, practitioners find the rhetoric of facilitative mediators implausible or naïve because it assumes, as a condition for participation,
the very cooperation that most mediators perceive as being part of
their job to try to create.
Most people analyze and verbalize their actions over a broad
range of their interpersonal conduct through distributive language
and lenses. That does not mean that they are correct in doing so, any
more than does the observation that most Americans have too much
fat in their normal diet lead to an endorsement of such eating habits
as healthy or wise. Nor does it lock the mediator into accepting such
54. For the original, and I believe the most instructive, explanation of the distributive/integrative distinction in bargaining theory, see RICHARD E. WALTON & ROBERT B.
MCKERSIE, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF LABOR NEGOTIATIONS 11-183 (2d ed. 1991).
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behaviors as the only eligible framework for dialogue. All it recognizes is that when people argue about or discuss things that matter
to them, some aspects of those discussions are predictably contentious. If persons are justifiably outraged by the manner in which
they have been treated, one should not expect them to describe such
matters in a calm, sanitized, or stylized manner, nor to ignore their
attitudes of righteous indignation in favor of feelings of collaboration
and accommodation. Yet if the grid’s image of the “facilitative mediator” is that of someone who requires disputing parties to behave collaboratively, then the mediator’s imposition of those process or “orientation” values suggests an immediate disconnection between the
process orientation and the reality with which parties experience
their conflict. Again, if the market is the driving force for mediator
selection, then disputing parties and their counsel will find the facilitative mediator clueless about critical features of their situations.
3. Implications of Preparation and Practice for the Grid
What is the consequence of the above analysis of mediator preparation and conduct? Relegating the “facilitative” mediator to such an
implausibly ineffective orientation is disturbing. Why does it sting?
The answer seems apparent and speaks to what the grid’s critics
have highlighted. The central values of the mediation process appear
least congruent with the notion of the “evaluative” mediator as portrayed by the grid. In its rich, widespread history, mediation is not a
process designed for having an expert apply some external criteria to
assess the strengths and weaknesses of the parties’ cases. Mediation
is neither a process designed to marshal evidence leading to an advisory opinion by a third party, nor a rehearsal trial in front of judge
or jury. Rather, mediation is a dialogue process designed to capture
the parties’ insights, imagination, and ideas that help them to participate in identifying and shaping their preferred outcomes. It is a
process employed with an acute sensitivity, by all participants, to
the context of the initial and continuing power relationship among
the parties; it is a process in which multiple sources of criteria and
reasons are tapped to help forge possibilities for progress. As Lon
Fuller so eloquently put it, mediation is a process in which the central quality is the “capacity to reorient the parties toward each other,
not by imposing rules on them, but by helping them to achieve a new
and shared perception of their relationship, a perception that will
redirect their attitudes and dispositions toward one another.” 55 Concepts of participation and empowerment are not idle pleasantries to
be cited in Law Day speeches, but are central principles of a demo55. Lon L. Fuller, Mediation—Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 305, 325
(1971).
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cratic society and critical features of consensual decisionmaking processes, of which mediation is traditionally thought to be a prime example.56 Aphorisms contain kernels of truth. Yitzhak Rabin’s nowfamous “You don’t make peace with your friends, you make peace
with your enemies”57 observation signals an important difference
about the central values of bargaining and settlement that distinguish it from an alternative process of victors, à la the Versailles
Treaty, “imposing” peace terms on their enemy. Bargaining—negotiating—and mediated negotiations require conversation, dialogue,
and interaction with perceived opponents. The processes require extending a fundamental respect to one’s counterpart in order to create
the possibility for striking a deal. Evaluative mediation distorts
those values and behaviors and effectively denies their possibilities.
Nevertheless, the image of the facilitative mediator created by the
grid gives one little pause for optimism. I believe that it is not the
orientation that is wrong, but the picture or stereotype of what the
facilitative mediator does or can do that is the source of mischief.
One way to frame the fundamental question is: Given that the
overarching goals of the mediation process are to engage the disputing parties in a constructive conversation that enhances their
understanding of the situation and supports their efforts to find acceptable settlement terms, is it inconsistent to attribute to a mediator such attributes as being assertive, firm, forceful, imaginative,
creative, active, or focused? Are mediator characteristics of being
knowledgeable about the matters in dispute or informed about the
nature of the disputants incompatible with the mediator values of
promoting effective party participation and the integrity of their
right to exercise veto power over the outcome? I think most assuredly not. What is misleading about the grid’s descriptions is that
they require anyone possessing and displaying such characteristics
to be placed in the grid’s “evaluative” sphere and thereby behave and
advance goals that are inconsistent with the central premises of mediation noted above.
The image of the placid intervener—that is, a mediator embracing
the facilitative orientation—who can be helpful to the parties
reaching realistic agreements about real problems but who, in the
process, never makes a suggestion or offers an idea that might be responsive to party concerns, does not aggressively prod one or more
parties to reconsider its proposed position, does not actively restructure the bargaining agenda based upon party presentations, or does

56. For a related discussion of the relationship between negotiation processes and
democratic theory, see Joseph B. Stulberg, Cultural Diversity and Democratic Institutions:
What Role for Negotiations?, 10 MEDIATION Q. 249, 249 (1993).
57. Mr. Arafat’s Entourage, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1996, at A20.
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not challenge party proposals (perhaps in caucus) as unworkable or
misleading based upon one’s knowledge of the field and practices, is
stunningly implausible. This image is unrealistic because it suggests
that the intervener can be helpful to the parties without her having
a perceptible impact or influence on the dynamics of party interaction. However, a mediator does not simply parrot the parties’ statements; she is not a bump on a log in terms of suggesting ideas or
possibilities for resolution. A mediator does influence dialogue and
interaction—which is why mediation can be a practical contribution
in resolving disputes. It is also true, however, that an intervener can
manage that influence in a way that does not undermine party participation and their efforts at imaginative problem solving.
A related reason for rejecting the grid’s image of the facilitative
mediator is that the grid’s account rests upon a constrained vision of
how people develop ideas for settlement or otherwise engage in
problem-solving dialogue. The grid’s picture of the facilitative mediator assumes that settlement options or other constructive ideas come
exclusively from dialogue between participants. The intervener cannot offer any suggestions or insights that might spur parties to think
of other ideas or acceptable modifications of the mediator’s ideas.
The grid rules out the possibility that a mediator, without being
evaluative, could suggest an idea for settlement that the parties find
attractive or acceptable and, as a result, freely embrace it. Ideas and
options, however, can have many parents. The grid imposes a pedigree test on ideas: if it comes from the parties, the mediator remains
facilitative; if the mediator is the source of an idea, the mediator is
evaluative. However, that means that persons are autonomous
agents only if they entertain ideas for which they are the source.
That vision renders incoherent the notion of personal autonomy and
the role of voluntary decisionmaking that lies at the heart of the mediation enterprise.
V. CONCLUSION
I believe that the mediation practitioners who were uncomfortably puzzled about their observation that they moved among the
quadrants of the grid expressed that discomfort because they felt,
presumed, and acted on the conviction that it was not inconsistent
with party choice for them to be knowledgeable, resourceful, and active interveners in mediation dialogues. They reflectively acknowledge that in order for them to generate movement among parties,
they routinely deploy such techniques as having the parties evaluate
the strengths and weaknesses of their cases as well as those of their
counterparts, assess the costs of not reaching resolution, forecast the
impact of the dispute on the parties’ relationship, and expose various
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party interests that are advanced or undermined by the bargaining
agenda and proffered solutions. They do that not to tell the parties
how the mediator believes the controversy ought to be resolved, but
rather as techniques for reorienting party perspectives. I believe
there is nothing insidious about mediators doing this. Reorienting
party perspectives is constructive. It is helpful. Moreover, it can be
done in a manner that is consistent with the governing aspirations of
having parties engage in the settlement-building process. A mediator
can do this as a part of consensual decisionmaking processes.
The distinction between facilitative and evaluative behaviors is
important to maintain for many reasons. One relates to appropriate
expectations and behavior by advocates who represent parties in
mediation conferences. Advocates who prepare for and participate in
a “mediation conference” that is “evaluative” will do so as if they are
preparing for a trial. However, the most experienced advocates who
are also knowledgeable about the qualities of the mediation process
recognize what a mistake that is. They encourage advocates to prepare for mediation as though it were a “trial-plus” procedure—to
prepare for mediation as one would prepare for trial—but, in addition, to prepare to frame the dispute and orient clients so that everyone in the discussion is in a position to capitalize on the unique opportunities for problem-solving that the mediation forum offers. 58
Nevertheless, such advice is irrelevant if the dominant mediator orientation is evaluative.
Finally, even Riskin has a vision of the ideal mediator for any individual case. He writes:
The grid can help us envision an ideal mediator for any individual case. She would be sufficiently flexible to employ the most appropriate orientation, strategies, and techniques as the participants’ needs present themselves. This would require the ability (1)
to both evaluate and facilitate, and (2) to see things both narrowly
and broadly. She would have subject-matter expertise and she
would be impartial.59

However, a significant drawback to even this ideal mediator orientation is that she has no home base on the grid itself. This ideal mediator emphatically is not someone who is simply all things to all people. The key insight above—and the grid’s ultimate Achilles’ heel—is
set forth in the second sentence above: “She would be sufficiently
flexible to employ the most appropriate orientation, strategies, and
techniques as the participants’ needs present themselves .”60 The par58. See LAWRENCE M. WATSON, JR., THE FLA. BAR, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
EFFECTIVE LEGAL REPRESENTATION IN MEDIATION 2-14 to -16 (1995).
59. Riskin, supra note 2, at 40-41 (footnote omitted).
60. Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
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ties may exhibit their needs but not articulate them; the ideal mediator is authorized to capitalize on that distinction on her own initiative. So what Riskin allows his ideal mediator to do—namely, to
act in certain ways even if one or more parties prefers otherwise—he
denies to mediators who commit themselves to starting or operating
only within one of the grid’s quadrants. Justifying a governing conception of mediation is importantly different from simply asserting
it. The grid embraces all “assertions” made in the name of mediation, but that is not sufficient. As set out above, I believe that only
the mediator who adopts a suitably re-described facilitative orientation is in a position to ground an approach to problem-solving that
anchors the behavior and principles of her performance in a manner
consistent with consensual decisionmaking. The stability of that conception enables the parties, ultimately, to decide whether consensual
decisionmaking is what they want. In that sense, the parties’ choice
to use or not use a mediator is informed by the integrity of the mediator’s defined orientation. That vision of consensual decisionmaking, and the facilitative role required to support it, should inform the
meaning of the term “mediation” in whatever statute, rule, or program it appears, and should constitute the standards by which we
select and evaluate mediator performance. No persuasive reason exists to accept anything less.

